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FOREWORD
When Edward Luttwak’s Strategy: The Logic of War
and Peace was published in 1987, it drew the attention
of the defense intellectual community almost immediately, and became required reading in many strategy
courses. The idea that war or strategy was driven by a
paradoxical logic was attractive. However, a number
of questions remain unanswered. If war has its own
logic, rather than its own grammar, where does the
logic of policy fit in? If the logic of strategy is, in fact,
paradoxical, how can it be taught? What are paradoxes, and can they be useful in guiding our strategic
choices?
All of these questions and more are touched upon
in this monograph by Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II.
He takes a closer look at the seemingly paradoxical
logic that is driving aspects of defense thinking today.
While the need for certain capabilities may indeed be
genuine, the manner in which the arguments for them
are made can actually undermine the overall rationale
for change.
This monograph will be an essential counterpart to
any course in which the paradoxical logic of strategy
is discussed.
		

		
		
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Current trends in defense thinking show signs of
being influenced by the notion that preparing for one
form of war has brought about another. We find evidence of this notion in a number of official speeches,
the 2008 National Defense Strategy, and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. It is captured in the
almost routine claim that America’s superiority in
conventional warfare is so great that it is driving our
adversaries toward irregular methods. All of these examples share the basic assumption that we are now
fighting (and will likely continue to fight) conflicts for
which we have not prepared—precisely because we
have not prepared for them. Thus, the modern complement—a preparation paradox—to the old Latin adage “If you want peace, prepare for war,” might well
be “If you want one kind of war, prepare for another.”
Paradoxical propositions of this sort have a certain
intellectual appeal: they are keen and pithy, and thus
are frequently used in debates. Edward Luttwak’s
classic work, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, attempted to argue that the realm of strategy is full of
paradoxical propositions. However, embracing any
paradox is rarely a good idea. This one rests on at
least two questionable premises. The first of these is
the assumption that America’s broad range of foes or
potential foes can be grouped together. They cannot.
Second, the preparation paradox assumes that substantive change is easier for our foes than it is for us,
but the evidence actually points in the opposite direction.
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Dissolving Paradoxes.
Paradoxes are intellectually intriguing, but they are
almost always resolved by rigorous logical analysis.
That was true of Luttwak’s basic argument regarding
war’s supposed self-contradictory propositions, and
it is true of the apparent paradox influencing defense
thinking today. Eventually, we either find (1) the essential item of information that reconciles the contradictory statements, or (2) that the premises of one or
all statements are false, or (3) that the paradox only
seemed valid because we initially made hasty generalizations.
Dissolving Strategic Paradoxes.
In his classic work, Luttwak maintained that “strategy is governed by a contradictory, paradoxical, contrarian logic,” and that this is true at all levels of war.
However, his argument is an example of attempting
to identify independent variables within a dynamic
environment that is, instead, made up of innumerable dependent ones. Military operations depend on
a larger, overriding logic, which is, at root, political.
Creating paradoxes out of difficult dilemmas, or risky
trade-offs, or the use of indirect methods is not analytically useful. If historical analysis has any value, then
we have to admit that exogenous factors are always
at work in war. It is not an independent activity with
its own logic. The grammar of war, which is often
confused with logic, is eminently linear. For instance,
logistical requirements—and the consequences of not
meeting them—are patently linear.
In fact, the phrase “if you want peace, prepare for
war” is an irony, not a paradox. That is to say that it
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is not a rule or a principle, but a clever way of saying “if you want peace, make yourself strong enough
to deter an attack.” As one prominent logician noted,
for example, it “is ironic [rather than paradoxical] that
the competent general must both protect his soldiery
and endanger them by use, and that he cannot do the
one without forgoing the other;” similarly, it “is ironic
[rather than paradoxical] that the individual soldier
cannot pursue glory without putting his life at risk.”1
Again, this logic is all precisely linear: the supposed
paradoxes dissolve once we realize that the link connecting the seemingly contradictory statements is the
concept of risk—accepting that mission accomplishment or self fulfillment requires a certain exposure to
harm. The idea that war has a paradoxical logic only
emerges when war is stripped of its political context,
that is, when its grammar is mistaken for a distinct
and overriding logic.
Dissolving the Preparation Paradox.
Just as Luttwak’s self-contradictory propositions
are dissolvable, so too is the apparent paradoxical
logic driving the argument that America’s superiority in conventional conflict is pushing its enemies into
irregular warfare. The underlying assumption is that
strength in one area only comes at the cost of weakness
in another; or that preparing for today’s challenges
tends to create tomorrow’s vulnerabilities. To be clear,
it is not paradoxical to attempt to redress a shortfall
in capabilities, as the U.S. military has done in recent
months with its increased focus on counterinsurgency
and irregular warfare. However, it is paradoxical to do
so if our efforts would be counterproductive, which is
what the contrarian logic of the preparation paradox
suggests.
vii

As noted at the outset, the preparation paradox
rests on the flawed assumption that America’s broad
range of enemies can be grouped together. Like any
major power, the United States has numerous adversaries and competitors arrayed at various points along
the threat spectrum. Many of them, especially violent
nonstate actors, have from the start employed irregular methods for important reasons, and are not likely
to abandon them, regardless of U.S. strengths.
Violent Nonstate Threats. A closer look at some
contemporary nonstate threats—such as al-Qaeda
and other violent jihadi groups, various criminal
gangs, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias de Colombia
(FARC), and other insurgent organizations—confirms
that they have not fundamentally changed their methods, though their targets and priorities have clearly
shifted over time.
State Competitors. Like the United States, a number
of contemporary state actors maintain some capabilities across the spectrum of conflict. However, we are
more likely to see cases where ways of war are refined
rather than changed in a comprehensive or revolutionary way. Whereas military conservatism was touted
as the principal reason for such outcomes, the real
culprits were strong strategic traditions, coupled with
compelling domestic interests. Studies of the 2006 war
in Lebanon illustrate that historical forces can exert a
correcting influence on military change. Prior to the
2006 campaign, the Israeli army shifted its training
and procurement efforts away from conventional,
joint combined arms operations toward low-intensity
conflict and counterterrorism. However, Hezbollah
presented a challenge that required competence in
conventional operations; as a result of critical assessments done in the aftermath of the war, the Israeli
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army shifted its efforts back toward developing competency in joint combined arms operations.
Perhaps a more telling example is China’s People’s
Liberation Army (PLA), which since the 1980s has attempted to modernize while retaining the basic doctrine of People’s War, which is characterized by an
emphasis on manpower and protracted, but limited,
conflict. Through an evolutionary series of revolutions, the PLA continues to integrate more high-tech
weaponry and information technology, as well as a series of “new” doctrinal concepts designed to optimize
them in practice. In sum, the Chinese military appears
to be following a modernization trajectory that will
turn it into an effective, high-tech, joint military organization, rather than a force that would shift direction
and re-embrace the guerrilla model.
The brief survey here has shown that revolutionary change—that is, moving from one part of the
spectrum of conflict to the other—is as rare among
nonstate actors as it is among states. Even if the U.S.
military had not demonstrated its superiority at conventional war in the early 1990s, few of our adversaries
would have challenged it in that realm for important
political and cultural reasons. Most were employing
irregular methods well before the 1990s, a fact that in
some ways should make them more dangerous since,
presumably, they have had more time to become proficient. The rub is that U.S. opponents need not change
radically in order to identify and attack any number of
U.S. vulnerabilities. Thus, it makes more sense for the
U.S. military to approach conventional and irregular
warfare not as separate kinds of conflicts, but as different priorities within the larger activity of war itself.
While the U.S. military remains eloquent in the
vernacular of battle, it is still developing fluency
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in the language of war. Embracing the preparation
paradox would only harm this effort. As we have
seen, the premises of the paradox are invalid; however, they have contributed to shaping many of the
debates within defense circles today. For that reason,
it is important to examine them, and to understand
why they are faulty. Just as the saying “If you want
peace, prepare for war” is little more than an irony, so
too is its modern-day complement “If you want one
kind of war, prepare for another.” Neither can really
serve as a guide for action. The problem is that some
propositions remain persuasive long after they have
been stripped of any semblance of logic.
ENDNOTE
1. Nicholas Rescher, Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range,
and Resolution, Chicago, IL: Open Court, 2001, p. 7.
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PREPARING FOR ONE WAR AND GETTING
ANOTHER?
The ancient Latin saying “If you want peace,
prepare for war,” was the starting point for Edward
Luttwak’s classic work, Strategy: The Logic of War and
Peace.1 Luttwak attempted to argue that the realm of
strategy is full of paradoxical propositions such as this
one. If current trends in defense thinking continue,
this famous adage might soon have a modern complement: “If you want one kind of war, prepare for another.” We can find several versions of this paradoxical proposition already at work in defense literature
today. Conspicuous examples include the arguments
for developing additional capabilities for irregular
warfare, which routinely claim that America’s superiority in conventional warfare is so great that it is driving our adversaries toward irregular methods. As U.S.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates recently noted: “our
enemies and potential adversaries—including nation
states—have gone to school on us,” and are thus moving away from conventional toward irregular means.2
Another version of the same paradoxical logic appears
in the 2008 National Defense Strategy with respect to
asymmetric means. That document declared: “U.S.
dominance in conventional warfare has given prospective adversaries, particularly non-state actors and
their state sponsors, strong motivation to adopt asymmetric methods to counter our advantages.”3 The 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review Report revealed a similar
rationale with respect to the history of U.S. military
preparedness by stating: “the wars we fight are seldom
the wars we would have planned.”4 The campaigns in
Iraq and Afghanistan are thus only the most recently
cited illustrations of this apparent tendency to prepare
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inappropriately. All of these examples share the basic
assumption that we are now fighting (and will likely
continue to fight) conflicts for which we are not prepared—precisely because we have not prepared for
them. Regardless of where one stands on the issue of
irregular capabilities, it is clear that a preparation paradox—the belief that preparing for one type of conflict
has merely increased the likelihood of having to fight
a very different one—has taken root in defense thinking.
Paradoxical propositions of this sort have a certain
intellectual appeal: they are keen and pithy, and thus
are frequently used in debates. This proposition in
particular is intended to offer a rationale for change,
and it seems to do so because one of warfare’s timehonored assumptions is that belligerents prefer to attack weaknesses rather than strengths. However, embracing any paradox is rarely a good idea. The logic
of a true paradox is, by definition, contradictory and,
thus, unlikely to stand up to closer inspection. This is
also the case with the preparation paradox, which actually sets up an endless cycle in which our efforts to
change work against one another: if we become strong
in conventional conflict, our foes will shift their efforts
toward unconventional means; if we shift to unconventional capabilities to compensate, our adversaries
will shift back toward conventional methods. In other
words, our efforts to build strength in one area will
invariably invite our foes to attack us in another. Instead of succumbing to this cycle, we would do better to cultivate strength at one end of the spectrum,
presumably the conventional end where the stakes are
often highest, and expend only minimal effort to manage risk elsewhere. Obviously, in so doing we reject
the original rationale for change.
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Fortunately, we can dissolve the preparation paradox because it rests on at least two questionable premises. The first of these is the assumption that America’s
broad range of foes or potential foes can be grouped together. They cannot. Each of them possesses a unique
combination of capabilities, and maintains them for
their own important political, economic, and cultural
reasons. In fact, most of the parties pursuing irregular
methods now were doing so well before American expertise at conventional conflict became evident, as it
so clearly did during the 1990-91 campaign in the Persian Gulf. Second, the preparation paradox assumes
that substantive change is easier for our foes than it is
for us, but the evidence actually points in the opposite
direction. Change is arguably as difficult for our competitors as it is for us for a variety of reasons, not the
least of which is that it tends to run against established
cultures and traditions. Also, while we might wish to
believe that our competitors will react to whatever we
do, they must, in fact, always consider how any significant change might alter their power relationships
with other regional or global competitors. Their freedom of action is, thus, limited in important ways.
DISSOLVING PARADOXES
Paradoxes are intellectually intriguing, but they
are almost always resolved by rigorous logical analysis. As we shall see, that was true of Luttwak’s basic
argument regarding war’s supposed self-contradictory propositions, and it is true of the apparent paradox
influencing defense thinking today. Eventually, we
either find (1) the essential item of information that
reconciles the contradictory statements, or (2) that the
premises of one or all statements are false, or (3) that
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the paradox only seemed valid because we initially
made hasty generalizations.5 The Birthday Paradox
is an example of the first. It is simply the apparent
impossibility that an individual who has reached the
age of 21, has only had five birthdays. The resolution
comes when we realize that the individual was born
on February 29, and thus has only had five true birthdays.6
The Barber Paradox is a classic example of the second. It involves a certain village:
in which there is a barber who shaves all and only
those men in the village who do not shave themselves.
Query: does the barber shave himself? Any man in this
village is shaved by the barber if and only if he is not
shaved by himself. Therefore the barber in particular
shaves himself if and only if he does not.7

Thus, we have an apparent paradox. Fortunately,
the paradox rests on a faulty premise, namely, that
such a barber could exist at all. We can see that such
a premise is absurd, and that thus the query does not
warrant an answer. The paradox itself serves as proof
that no such barber could exist; some philosophers refer to this method of exposing a faulty premise as a
form of reductio ad absurdum because it involves stripping the paradox to its simplest form to expose the
logical flaw that created it in the first place. 8
There is another class of paradox that consists of
rhetorical or semantic contradictions. These are linguistic sleights of hand or attempts to exploit the pliability of language to construct statements that are
grammatically correct, but completely nonsensical. It
is tempting to see these as potentially soluble puzzles,
or brain teasers, but they are not. They are in a class of
paradox that we may call trivial. The Liar’s Paradox is
4

perhaps the most famous and most enduring of these;
it is a single statement: “This sentence is false.” The
problem is that if the statement is true, then it cannot be false, which it says that it is. Yet, if it is false,
as it claims to be, then it is true, which it says that it
is not. Thus, the paradox. In fact, the contradiction is
simply not resolvable as written, though philosophers
and logicians have and will continue to try.9 It simply shows that language can be manipulated to create false paradoxes. Fortunately, strategists need not
bother with this class of paradox; their concern is with
logical paradoxes, as in the first example.
Dissolving Strategic Paradoxes.
In his classic work, Luttwak maintained that “strategy is governed by a contradictory, paradoxical, contrarian logic,” and that this is true at all levels of war.10
Indeed, he attempted to prove that a paradoxical logic
is operative in all major strategic, operational, tactical,
and technical principles. He described the logic “in its
totality as the coming together, even the reversal, of opposites;” it is manifest “in all that is strategical, in all that
is characterized by the struggle of adversary wills.” In
the realm of strategy, “a course of action cannot persist indefinitely” because it “will tend to evolve into
its opposite, unless the logic of strategy is outweighed
by some exogenous change in the circumstances of the
participants.” In short, the paradoxical logic of strategy induces a “self-negating evolution.”11
To illustrate how this logic works, Luttwak borrowed examples from history: Germany’s invasion of
the Netherlands, Belgium, and France in 1940; the German offensive into the Soviet Union in 1941; the Soviet
counteroffensives of 1942, 1943, and 1944-45; the North
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African campaigns of 1941-43; the advance of the western Allies across France in 1944; and the campaigns in
Korea in 1950 and 1951. All of these campaigns were
intended to illustrate how Clausewitz’s “culminating
point of victory”—the idea that an army’s advance
can exceed its ability to sustain itself—is an example
of paradoxical logic, specifically, that, barring the introduction of external factors, success can only extend
so far before it fails. In other words, a victorious military force would have to “pause and recuperate from
its own successful advance” in order to overcome the
attritional effects of strategic consumption.12 Luttwak
also extended this phenomenon to the political dimension, arguing that, as one achieves victory after
victory, one’s allies and partners begin to fear for their
own security and start to realign themselves so as to
undermine or contain the successful party. It would
seem, then, that the familiar cliché is in fact true: success does indeed contain the seeds of its own demise.
However, Luttwak’s argument is an example of
attempting to identify independent variables within
a dynamic environment that is instead made up of innumerable dependent ones. To be sure, it is tempting
to regard attack and defense as discrete and opposite
forms of war; but, they depend on a larger, overriding
logic, which is, at root, political. Moreover, equilibrium is rarely present in the sense that transitioning
from one form of war to another can be said to occur as
a sequence of corresponding trade-offs. Instead, when
we consider the details—such as how an opponent’s
army might be on the defensive while its air force and
navy are on the offensive, or how forces in reserve are
neither attacking nor defending, or how an advancing
column must maintain an all-round defensive posture
as it attacks—the premises that brought the paradox
into being begin to dissolve, and rather quickly.
6

Creating paradoxes out of difficult dilemmas, or
risky trade-offs, or the use of indirect methods is not
analytically useful. If historical analysis has any value,
then we have to admit that exogenous factors are always at work in war. Hitler’s invasion of the Netherlands, Belgium, and France in 1940 was facilitated by
the Allies’ failure to interdict German supply columns,
which were tied up in massive traffic jams throughout
the Ardennes forest.13 To that error must be added the
Allies’ failure to execute a potentially crippling counterattack at the French town of Arras. An opponent’s
errors of omission and commission, in other words,
would appear to be critical to the outcome of any campaign, but they are exogenous factors with respect to
the logic of strategy as Luttwak defines it.
Regarding the German offensive against the Soviet
Union in 1941, tremendous resources were stripped
away from the invading military forces to implement
Nazi policies of ethnic cleansing and genocide; moreover, opportunities to draw some of the Soviet states
from Moscow politically, and thus weaken Stalin,
were shunned by the Reich’s leadership.14 Put differently, we could add attitudes of racial superiority and
hubris to the exogenous factors that influenced Germany’s planning for the campaign; or we could ask at
what point in a campaign is the military or strategic
logic overcome by the political logic that established
the purpose for the war in the first place. This question
is also germane to the campaigns in North Africa from
1941-42, which the political leadership on both sides
saw as little more than marginal until late 1942.15
Moreover, the operational pauses the Red Army
made in its series of counteroffensives in 1944-45
owed much to an overriding political logic, namely,
that Stalin sought to establish and consolidate his hold
on eastern Europe; the clearest example of this was his
7

decision to halt the Red Army just near the Vistula in
the summer of 1944 to allow the Germans to put down
the Warsaw uprising, destroy the Armia Krajowa, and
thus weaken the influence of the Polish government
in exile.16 In addition, considerable exogenous momentum influenced the power equation, as former
German allies, such as Romania, changed sides in the
last year of the war. Such events undermine Luttwak’s
argument by giving credence to the adage that success
breeds success, while also confounding efforts to isolate the hypothetical intrinsic logic of military operations. Likewise, we should not underestimate the role
that political logic played with respect to the Korean
conflict, particularly as the Truman administration
shifted its goals in the spring of 1951, almost in midstride, in order to avoid lateral escalation and to put a
ceiling on U.S efforts.17
Logistical requirements—and the consequences
of not meeting them—are patently linear. Despite an
accumulation of knowledge over centuries, knowing
how far one can push one’s troops and equipment in a
campaign is still more art than science.18 The potential
consequences of overstretch, whether operational or
political in nature, are quite linear; in fact, the likely
reactions to any outstanding successes—whether
concerning individuals or larger bodies—are for all
intents and purposes remarkably predictable. That
states would put their own interests first is hardly
surprising. What would be surprising, actually, is to
discover when success ever consistently bred success.
Likewise, violating common sense or taking risks to
gain an advantage or taking certain actions to deter
other actions is not paradoxical, but perfectly logical.
And the logic itself is not contrarian or contradictory, but demonstrably linear. Closer analysis reveals,
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therefore, that the logic of culmination is not genuinely paradoxical.
For Luttwak, a strategic logic that is not paradoxical would look something like: “if you want peace,
prepare for peace.” This is indeed linear logic, or what
Luttwak also referred to as common sense. Interestingly, linear logic often suffices simply because it does
make sense. Preparing for peace—that is, disarming or
agreeing to limit arms—does in some cases lead to, or
perpetuate, peace. However, the adage: “if you want
peace, prepare for war” also appears to suffice from the
standpoint of deterring aggression; one could argue
that this was, in fact, the strategic logic that prevailed
throughout the Cold War. Yet, the paradoxical logic
of preparing for war to get peace often does not work:
instead of contributing to peace, it does the opposite
by promoting an arms race, which even if it does not
lead directly to war, does heighten tensions and raise
the costs of diplomatic errors. Preparing for war did
just that in the decades before 1914, when the world’s
first three-dimensional arms race (air, land, and sea)
occurred.19 The arms race did not cause World War I,
but it clearly set the stage. Recent scholarship on the
arms race that preceded World War II points to a similar conclusion.20
In fact, the phrase “if you want peace, prepare for
war” is an irony, not a paradox. That is to say, it is not
a rule or a principle, but rather a clever way of saying “if you want peace, make yourself strong enough
to deter an attack.” As one prominent logician noted,
for example, it “is ironic (rather than paradoxical) that
the competent general must both protect his soldiery
and endanger them by use, and that he cannot do the
one without forgoing the other;” similarly, it “is ironic
(rather than paradoxical) that the individual soldier
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cannot pursue glory without putting his life at risk.”21
Again, this logic is all precisely linear: the supposed
paradoxes dissolve once we realize that the link connecting the seemingly contradictory statements is the
concept of risk—accepting that mission accomplishment or self fulfillment requires a certain exposure to
harm. The idea that war has a paradoxical logic only
emerges when war is stripped of its political context,
that is, when its grammar is mistaken for a distinct
and overriding logic.
Dissolving the Preparation Paradox.
Just as Luttwak’s self-contradictory propositions
are dissolvable, so, too, is the apparent paradoxical
logic driving the argument that America’s superiority in conventional conflict is pushing its enemies into
irregular warfare. The underlying assumption is that
strength in one area only comes at the cost of weakness in another; or that preparing for today’s challenges tends to create tomorrow’s vulnerabilities. As
mentioned earlier, if it is true that our demonstrated
strength in one end of the spectrum of conflict is pushing our opponents toward the other end, then as our
capabilities in irregular warfare improve, we must
expect that our foes will begin to move back toward
conventional means, that is, away from our strength.
Yet, again, as we respond by shifting more resources
back toward conventional warfare, we must expect
that our adversaries will swing once again toward irregular conflict. Unfortunately, with fiscal constraints
becoming ever more acute, the obvious solution of
trying to improve our capabilities across the spectrum
of conflict will not hold up.22 We will likely have to
prioritize the development of capabilities in one part
of the spectrum at a time.
10

To be clear, it is not paradoxical to attempt to redress a shortfall in capabilities, as the U.S. military
has done in recent months with its increased focus on
counterinsurgency and irregular warfare. However, it
is paradoxical to do so if our efforts would be counterproductive, which is what the contrarian logic of the
preparation paradox suggests. If we accept its premise
that our opponents can and will shift priorities from
one end of the spectrum to the other depending on
our actions, then it would make better sense, fiscally
and otherwise, for us to cultivate our expertise in conventional wars, while managing risk at the other end
of the spectrum. After all, major conventional wars
might only come once or twice per century, but they
tend to involve the highest stakes. This logic obviously
runs counter to the rationale for developing additional
irregular capabilities; in fact, it turns it on its head.
However, as noted at the outset, the preparation
paradox rests on the flawed assumption that America’s broad range of enemies can be grouped together.
Like any major power, the United States has numerous
adversaries and competitors arrayed at various points
along the threat spectrum. Many of them, especially
violent nonstate actors, have from the start employed
irregular methods for important reasons, and are not
likely to abandon them, regardless of U.S. strengths.
To be sure, irregular warfare remains a conscious and
sensible choice for many small groups given their
resources. But more than that, the organizations, cultures, and narratives that they built around this type
of armed conflict over the course of decades now work
against radical change. For these reasons, revolutionary change for nonstate actors is, arguably, more difficult than it would be for a major power such as the
United States, which already has capabilities arrayed,
in some depth, across the spectrum of conflict.
11

Violent Nonstate Threats. A closer look at some
contemporary nonstate threats—such as al-Qaeda
and other violent jihadi groups, various criminal
gangs, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias de Colombia
(FARC), and other insurgent organizations—confirms
that they have not fundamentally changed their methods, though their targets and priorities have clearly
shifted over time. They still use violence both directly
and indirectly (sometimes with precision and sometimes indiscriminately) to create instability, to weaken
and eventually depose certain regimes, and to replace
them when possible.23 For instance, al-Qaeda’s targets
and priorities have shifted in accordance with its intentions to seek revolutionary change by means of a
“defensive Jihad” involving “military, economic, and
cultural-moral” dimensions.24 Still, since the group’s
apparent origins in 1988, its tactics have essentially
evolved into and remained those of the guerrilla and
the terrorist, and that holds true for its numerous offshoots and affiliates as well.25 We can find evidence
of the former in the mujahedeen’s campaign against
the Soviets in Afghanistan in the late 1980s, as well as
many of the tactics employed against Coalition forces
in Iraq. We can see the latter in the attempt to topple
the World Trade Center in 1993, the attacks against
the U.S. Embassy in East Africa in 1998 and the USS
Cole in 2000, and those of September 11, 2001, as well
as the bombings in Madrid in 2004 and in London on
July 7, 2005.26 Indeed, the guerrilla-terrorist model is
a flexible one in which the range of violence can run
the gamut from ambushes or direct assaults against
military units to suicide attacks against innocent noncombatants in major urban centers. It does, however,
require extensive manipulation of information, which
clearly has been made easier by the recent explosion
of information technologies.27
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Nonetheless, al-Qaeda and the larger jihadi movement, of which it is more or less a part, is not only
decentralized, but actually politically divided. Jihadi
leaders, for instance, actively compete for recruits and
political influence, while an underlying tension persists between jihadi ideologues and foot soldiers.28 No
form of centralized command structure has emerged
that can consistently link acts of violence to political
aims, or bridge the gaps between jihadi strategists
and fighters. In fact, there is some evidence to suggest that a rudimentary form of jihadi operational art
is developing, inspired more or less by the writings
of Abu Musab al Suri, to compensate in part for the
group’s political divisions and the lack of unity of effort among its branches.29 The competition among the
leaders is such that the fragmentation is likely to continue. This trend ensures that the task of combating alQaeda and similar groups will remain a complex one,
but it continues to reward the time-honored strategy
of divide and conquer. At the same time, the divisions
themselves work against the possibility that a radical
shift in methods will occur, even as they make it more
likely that vexing adjustments within methods will
take place.
To be sure, the threats posed by violent nonstate
actors neither begin nor end with the jihadi movement. There is what some scholars perceive as a growing gang phenomenon, for instance, a term that refers
to the many street gangs and transnational criminal
organizations, which appear to have greater mobility
and influence today than previously, thanks in part
to the development of information and transportation
technologies.30 These groups are believed to consist
of “first-, second-, and third-generation street gangs,
Mafia families, illegal drug traffickers, warlords, ter-
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rorists, and insurgents,” and often pose an indirect,
but real threat to state security and sovereignty.31
First-generation gangs are said to have a turf orientation, while second-generation gangs are defined as
those concerned with conducting business and only
those political objectives that facilitate the generation
of revenue; third-generation gangs, by comparison,
are mercenary in orientation, and pursue explicit political and social ends, sometimes independently and
sometimes at the behest of a state. While it might be
tempting to classify this phenomenon as a new type of
insurgency, doing so might only further obscure our
understanding of what is actually taking place.32
Due in part to Iraq’s fluctuating security situation,
we can find examples of all of the types of groups there
that are said to make up the gang phenomenon. Iraq
appears to have offered what some scholars refer to as
a “criminal opportunity space,” which various insurgent groups, militias, political parties, and tribes have
exploited to advance their agendas more effectively.33
Organized crime in Iraq did not emerge in response
to the Coalition victory and subsequent occupation;
but rather appears to have had “deep roots in an authoritarian and corrupt state subject to international
sanctions,” and perhaps even much earlier than that.34
Further research might well reveal that organized
crime has been thriving for many decades. While
many groups in the contemporary gang phenomenon
appear interested primarily in profit, they also seem to
have realized that political power and control of territory offered ways to enhance profit. Hence, they set
out to “neutralize, control, or depose governments” to
achieve the freedom of action and favorable environments they needed in order to conduct “business.”35
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The Coalition’s failure to recognize and prepare
for the extent and influence of organized crime in Iraq
was clearly a strategic mistake. That a tenuous alliance
of sorts or a loose system of cooperation might develop
between criminal gangs and any resistance movement
or insurgency should not have come as a surprise; nor
is it surprising that distinctions between criminals
and insurgents in Iraq or Afghanistan would often
prove to be dubious, and that their networks often
meshed or overlapped together with multiple funding
streams.36 Analysts generally agree that the migration
of former Iraqi soldiers into various insurgent groups
could have been mitigated.37 In fact, had the Coalition
moved more decisively during the first few months
when “most of the insurgent activities were rather episodic, badly organized, and ineffective,” the growth
of the insurgency might have been curbed.38 Perhaps,
as some analysts suggest, Washington’s perceptions
regarding the U.S. military’s ability to adapt contributed to the decision to accept risk with regard to postconflict operations in Iraq.39 Still, consciously deciding
not to prepare for certain contingencies because doing
so might be too costly politically is qualitatively different from failing to prepare because the contingencies were not foreseen in the first place.
Some sources suggest that a “cyclical sharing network” emerged in Iraq with Iraqi Shi’a groups using
and refining the development of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and ambush techniques, which
they received from or were trained in by Lebanon’s
Hezbollah and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps (IRGC), or Quds Force; then the Shi’a groups
report the results of these innovations back to Hezbollah and the Quds Force for incorporation into training
programs and further dissemination and transmission

15

elsewhere, such as to the Taliban.40 There has been
consistent evidence that Iran has backed Hezbollah
and to some extent Hamas, and more recently a number of Shi’a groups in Iraq, though this was earlier disputed.41 Presumably, Iran limits the cycle in part due
to resource constraints, but also in part to avoid provoking the United States, or inspiring an anti-Iranian
backlash among Arab populations.42 Nonetheless, the
use of irregular forces has long been an important way
for Iran to exert influence in the region. That approach
is likely to continue, regardless of how extensive
American efforts are in expanding its irregular capabilities, and whether or not Iran succeeds in developing nuclear weapons.
Another obvious example of a violent nonstate actor that deserves discussion is the FARC. According
to some, it became a major political factor in Colombia only because the narcotics trade provided the resources necessary for the group to thrive.43 The FARC
grew from an organization of approximately 2,000
guerrilla fighters in 1982, to about 5,000 fighters by
1990, and to some 15,000-20,000 guerrillas by 2000.44
In short, over the course of 2 decades, it expanded
in size by an order of magnitude, established more
than 60 “fronts” (units of 60 to 400 personnel), and acquired the capacity to conduct mobile warfare and to
engage in combat with regular military units of equal
size. Its influence had grown so much that some experts were prepared to write Colombia off as a narcostate. The FARC’s repertoire of tactics falls within the
guerrilla-terrorist model, which is to say it includes
guerrilla and small-unit conventional operations, car
bombings, torture, assassination, kidnapping, hijacking, and extortion. By these means, it terrorized and
intimidated or coerced government officials and the
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general public. In 2000, a former Colombian minister
of defense reported: “In the last 15 years . . . four presidential candidates, 200 judges and investigators, and
half the Supreme Court’s justices, 1,200 police officers,
151 journalists, and more than 300,000 ordinary Colombians have been murdered.”45
Interestingly, after less than a decade, some analysts are now referring to Colombia as a success story—the “Colombian Miracle”—because the power
and influence of the FARC have been significantly diminished.46 The United States Southern Command, for
instance, recently reported that the FARC “has been
reduced to an estimated 9,000 fighters,” less than half
its estimated strength in 2002, and the areas it controls
are now only those bordering Venezuela and Brazil.47
Moreover, several key leaders have been killed or
captured, and the number of desertions of mid-level
cadre was reported at 3,027 in 2008, compared to 529
in 2002. Kidnapping victims and terrorist acts are
down 87 percent and 82 percent, respectively.48 This
turn-around has been due to a number of factors, including combined U.S.-Colombian actions under Plan
Colombia, and measures taken by President Alvaro
Uribe’s administration, which have benefited from
high-level intelligence penetration of the FARC. To be
sure, the FARC is far from defeated; it still supplies
about 50 percent of the world’s cocaine, for instance,
and it appears to be receiving materiel support from
Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, who appears be using it to
maintain tensions in Colombia.49 The turns are likely
to continue; but, the FARC’s development of light
infantry capabilities and Hezbollah’s aspirations to
become more than a guerrilla organization notwithstanding, these groups are fine-tuning their ways of
war rather than completely changing them.50
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State Competitors. Like the United States, a number
of contemporary state actors maintain some capabilities across the spectrum of conflict. However, we are
more likely to see cases in which ways of war are refined rather than changed in a comprehensive or revolutionary way. Advocates of the revolution in military
affairs (RMA) and network-centric warfare have used
the models of Britain and France as examples of states
that failed to transform their ways of fighting, at least
to the extent Germany purportedly did, in the decades
before World War II.51 Whereas military conservatism
was touted as the principal reason for that failure, the
real culprits were strong strategic traditions coupled
with compelling domestic interests. The British gave
greater priority to maintaining naval supremacy, an
established strategic tradition for them well before
the 20th century; the French put more emphasis on
technological innovation, a long-standing cultural
strength, in the form of the Maginot Line, which partly also assuaged domestic concerns.52
Interestingly, studies of the 2006 war in Lebanon
illustrate that historical forces can exert a correcting
influence on military change. Prior to the 2006 campaign, the Israeli army shifted its training and procurement efforts away from conventional, joint combined arms operations toward low-intensity conflict
and counterterrorism. However, Hezbollah presented
a challenge that required competence in conventional
operations. As a result of critical assessments done in
the aftermath of the war, the Israeli army shifted its
efforts back toward developing competency in joint
combined arms operations.53 In short, preferred ways
of fighting owe much to the collective force of political, cultural, and geographic influences.
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Perhaps a more telling example is China’s People’s
Liberation Army (PLA), which has attempted since the
1980s to modernize while retaining the basic doctrine
of People’s War, which is characterized by an emphasis on manpower and protracted, but limited, conflict.54 The roots of the doctrine do indeed run deep,
presumably reaching as far back as the Chinese Red
Army’s founding in 1927. The doctrine is not without
its merits, which were clearly demonstrated in the
guerrilla operations it conducted against the Japanese
from 1937 to 1945, and then against the army of the
Kuomintang from 1945 to 1946, and in the eventual
conversion to offensive operations from 1947 to 1950.55
In fact, it is not clear that the PLA ever went back to
the guerrilla model after converting to offensive operations in 1947; instead, the doctrine of People’s War
became synonymous with physical and psychological
mobilization.56
A more consistent theme with respect to reform
has been the Chinese army’s repeated attempts, and
only limited successes, at projecting power and sustaining it over significant distances and for prolonged
periods of time. This was the case, for instance, with
the force of Chinese “volunteers” that participated in
the Korean conflict from 1950 to 1953. By the time the
third Chinese offensive was launched on December
31, 1950, severe shortages in food and ammunition
and problems with exhaustion, unresponsive command and control structures, and lack of replacements
had become acute.57 Mao Zedong might have insisted
that any battle could be conducted using principles
of guerrilla warfare; however, that did not necessarily mean those principles could win wars. In fact,
the tactics that initially worked for the Chinese army
resemble more those of classic infiltration followed
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closely by massed infantry assaults against isolated
units; these tactics are not necessarily guerrilla in nature, even under Mao’s rather permissive definition of
the concept.
Moreover, when Joseph Stalin and Mao most desired a rapid and decisive campaign in the spring of
1951 to push United Nations (UN) forces off the Korean peninsula, the Chinese army was unable to deliver
it.58 It had neither the doctrinal underpinnings, nor the
training, nor the material wherewithal to switch to an
entirely different mode of warfare. Ironically, the very
characteristics that were thought to be strengths for
the Chinese army, namely, its reliance on manpower
and psychological motivation, particularly in rugged
terrain and severe weather, had become hindrances.
It was simply not able to adopt a new approach and
overcome those impediments when Mao’s political
logic asked it to. After the summer of 1951, the Chinese army began to mirror its Western opponents,
“maintaining a relatively stable front line; increasing
[Chinese People’s Volunteer Force] air force, artillery,
and tank units; and beefing up logistical support.”59
In short, its operations became more joint; yet, this
change, too, was an evolutionary process, despite the
exigencies of modern war.60
The defeat of the Tibetan rebellion in 1959 and the
successful border war with India in 1962 were relatively quick campaigns for the Chinese army.61 In the
latter, which has been called the “most clear-cut, ‘textbook’ PLA victory ever outside of Chinese territory,”
the Chinese army followed a doctrine of maneuver,
isolation, and annihilation of enemy units, much as it
had in the last phases of the Civil War, and had attempted to do during the “five campaigns” period
(1950-51) of the Korean conflict.62 However, the PLA’s
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brief but costly punitive campaign against Vietnam in
1979 is also notable not only for the logistical and communications shortfalls that seem to plague it whenever it attempts to project power much beyond its
borders, but also for the PLA’s “poor discipline, low
morale, combat ineffectiveness, and high casualties.”63
In short, the doctrine of People’s War has had to become much more elastic than it was when originally
conceived by Mao.64
Through an evolutionary series of revolutions,
the PLA continues to integrate more high-tech weaponry and information technology, as well as a series
of “new” doctrinal concepts designed to optimize
them in practice; the aim is to achieve a “Revolution
in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics,”
which ostensibly would enable the PLA to fight “Local War Under the Conditions of Informatization.”65
Emphasis is on achieving greater jointness to launch
focused attacks against purportedly “asymmetric”
targets, namely, the principal “combat system of the
opponent,” so as to erode its cohesion in unexpected
ways.”66 The opponent’s “support system” is considered the center of gravity, and neutralizing it is seen as
the surest way to offset an unfavorable imbalance in
capabilities, and to increase the chances for a “quick,
decisive victory.”67 Interestingly, while this move is a
clear departure from early Maoist doctrine, which emphasized isolation and annihilation, it is hardly asymmetric in substance.68 Rather, it emulates the technocentric theories developed by U.S. military during the
1990s RMA, which had obvious roots in German operational thinking of the 1930s and 1940s. However, the
PLA has not eschewed embracing military operations
other than war (MOOTW) as an essential mission set,
the accomplishment of which facilitates its expanding
regional and global interests.69
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The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has
seen little combat action since it was founded in 1949;
however, it is also transforming from a continental defense force, which employed “people’s war at sea,” to
a blue water navy, with two aircraft carriers projected
for deployment by 2015.70 Much speculation surrounds
the purposes these carriers might serve—to include
protecting sea lines of communication, defending territorial claims, responding to humanitarian and disaster relief crises, and employment in contingencies regarding Taiwan—but the symbolic value they offer as
evidence that China has come of age as a naval power
is clear.71 The PLAN’s focus still seems to be on developing anti-access strategies; these are designed to
deter adversaries from participating in local conflicts
by making the costs of intervening too high, militarily
and politically. Hence, priority is given to improving
“extended-range power projection, long-range precision strike, maritime C4ISR [command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance], expeditionary logistics, forward
basing.”72 The former concept of layered coastal defense has obvious roots in the system employed by
the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but does suit
Chinese strengths.73 Still, the PLAN is rather short of
the estimated 60 modern submarines it would need
to fulfill its anti-carrier denial mission, though some
suggest that this gap could close by 2020.74
Growth within the People’s Liberation Army Air
Force (PLAAF) since 1949 has been called “remarkable,” less for its size than its direction.75 Experts describe its past performance in major conflicts as politically limited or endeavoring to acquire “concrete
knowledge” of air operations.76 Nonetheless, as new
generations of strike and support aircraft, precision-
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guided munitions, and modernized C4ISR capabilities
are introduced, the PLAAF is increasing its ability to
carry out traditional missions, such as air defense and
support for ground forces, while also developing the
capability to launch offensive strikes against ground
and naval targets beyond China’s borders.
In sum, the Chinese military appears to be following a modernization trajectory that will turn it into an
effective, high-tech, joint military organization, rather
than a force that would shift direction and re-embrace
the guerrilla model. This path accords with China’s
efforts to develop a “constant global presence.”77 As
experts note, its direction is more “reflective of aspirations as opposed to current capabilities, but no one
can know for sure.”78 Notably, some military thinkers in China have recently found utility in the phrase
“If you want peace, prepare for war.”79 The message
is, evidently, that to secure for itself a peaceful rise
to greater power and influence, Beijing must prepare
for conflict, especially with the United States, but not
only with it.80 China must also consider perceived
challenges from India, Russia, and Japan, among others.81 Given the obvious momentum the Chinese military is developing within the realm of conventional
warfare and the strategic rationale for it, a major shift
in the Chinese way of war is unlikely, though refinement is clearly underway. The United States is, thus,
right to concern itself with China’s continued development of cyber technology, anti-satellite capabilities,
anti-air and anti-ship weaponry, ballistic missiles, and
bio-genetic technologies, whether these are classified
as conventional, unconventional, or asymmetric.82
Indeed, with technological innovations reaching unprecedented levels in the 21st century, it is not clear
that any form of technology now warrants the title
unconventional or asymmetric.
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The brief survey here has shown that revolutionary change—that is, moving from one part of the spectrum of conflict to the other—is as rare among nonstate
actors as it is among states.83 Small groups, almost by
definition, have more difficulty acquiring the resources necessary to fight conventionally. Limiting factors,
such as cultural practices and traditions, are just as
important for nonstate actors as they are for states.
Historically, the stronger inclination is in the direction
of adaptation rather than transformation. Evolutionary change also makes sense from the standpoint of
managing risk. Nonstate actors and states must contend with an array of threats. Al-Qaeda must compete
against other groups within the jihadi movement,
and China must take into account not only how best
to respond to perceived challenges from the United
States, but also to those from India, Russia, and Japan,
to mention only the most obvious. In other words, despite the abundance of rhetoric about how flexible and
adaptable our foes are, change is not necessarily any
easier for them than it is for us.
Even if the U.S. military had not demonstrated its
superiority at conventional war in the early 1990s, few
of our adversaries would have challenged us in that
realm for important political and cultural reasons.
Most were employing irregular methods well before the 1990s, a fact that in some ways should make
them more dangerous since, presumably, they have
had more time to become proficient. They also have
every reason to continue to hone their expertise. It is
more cost-effective for them to try to find new niche
capabilities in those areas where they have already
established a foundation of knowledge and capability, rather than to shift to another segment of the spectrum. The evolution of IEDs is a case in point.84 The
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rub is that our opponents need not change radically
to identify and attack any number of our vulnerabilities. Thus, it makes more sense for the U.S. military
to approach conventional and irregular warfare not
as separate kinds of conflicts, but as different priorities within the larger activity of war itself.85 The priority for counterinsurgency operations, for instance, is
protection of the population.86 A clear understanding
of the mission, and its attendant priorities, is always
critical.
Terms like “hybrid war” are keen attempts to bring
the two kinds warfare together.87 However, stripping
away the sundry adjectives and viewing wars as
war—rather than as battles writ large—would work
even better. The many definitions of types of war and
the various descriptors we attach to the term “war”
suggest we have not yet transitioned from a way of
battle to a way of war. We still have difficulty thinking of war holistically, as something multifaceted and
dynamic. That resistance movements or insurgencies
develop when one belligerent has occupied the territory of another is the rule, not the exception; yet, the
adjective irregular suggests the opposite is true. The
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq were not so much
examples of preparing for the wrong wars, as much
as they were evidence of the tendency to prepare for
battles rather than war. That there were not enough
forces on hand early enough to provide a hedge
against uncertainty, and then to respond to changes in
the situation as they developed, was a consequence of
many things, not the least of which was a technology
focused, battle-centric approach to war. The essence
of war may be the violent clash of arms, but war itself
is much more.
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While the U.S. military remains eloquent in the
vernacular of battle, it is still developing fluency
in the language of war. Embracing the preparation
paradox would only harm this effort. As we have
seen, the premises of the paradox are invalid; however, they have contributed to shaping many of the
debates within defense circles today. For that reason,
it is important to examine them, and to understand
why they are faulty. Just as the saying “If you want
peace, prepare for war” is little more than an irony, so
too is its modern-day complement “If you want one
kind of war, prepare for another.” Neither can really
serve as a guide for action. The problem is that some
propositions remain persuasive long after they have
been stripped of any semblance of logic.
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